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Christopher Yukins 
Professor of Government Procurement Law 
George Washington University Law School, Washington, D.C.
I. INTRODUCTION
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times -- a year marked by genuine progress in public procure-
ment law in some nations, and partial paralysis in others. This article presents the experience of Sweden (as 
part of the European Union), the United Kingdom (which is slated soon to depart from the EU, via “Brexit”), 
and the United States (in the first year of the Trump administration). As the discussion below reflects, while 
Sweden and other members of the European Union continue to develop a vital and evolving body of public 
procurement law, the United Kingdom has been distracted by Brexit, and the United States made, in 2017, 
almost no regulatory progress at all -- though stasis itself yielded some interesting insights.
This piece proceeds in three parts, prepared primarily by Andrea Sundstrand (Part II, on Sweden 
and the European Union), Michael Bowsher (Part III, on the United Kingdom) and Christopher Yukins 
(Introduction, Part IV on the United States, and Conclusion).
II. ExPERIENCE IN SWEDEN AS A EUROPEAN MEMBER STATE1
In 2017, Sweden implemented the European Union’s public procurement Directives which were adopted 
in 2014. See, e.g., Andrea Sundstrand, International Procurement Developments in 2016 -- Part III: The 
European Union’s New Procurement Rules, 2017 Gov’t Contracts Year in Review Briefs 5. Sweden’s imple-
mentation reflected longstanding national concerns for protecting labor conditions in public procurement.
A. Labor conditions in public procurements in Sweden
On January 1, 1994, Sweden enacted its first law on public procurement based on EU Directives. After the act 
came into force and for a long period of time, the general perception in Sweden, as well as in the EU Commission, 
was that it was only possible in public procurements to set selection criteria that referred to a financial advantage 
for the contracting authority (see, for example, Swedish preparatory work 1992/93: 88, p. 52 and the Commission’s 
Interpretative Communication on the Public Procurement Opportunities, COM (2001) 274 final). This made it 
less likely that labor conditions would be considered as selection criteria in awarding public contracts.
Not even the decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which in its 1988 judgment in Beentjes 
(C-31/87, EU:C:1988:422) allowed for consideration of labor conditions, convinced attorneys and contracting 
authorities to consider such criteria possible. Instead it was generally assumed that it was only possible 
Reprinted from West Government ContraCts Year In revIeW CoverInG 2017 ConferenCe BrIefs, with per-
mission of Thomson Reuters. Copyright © 2018. Further use without the permission of West is prohibited. 
For further information about this publication, please visit west.thomson.com/store, or call 800.328.9352.
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in public procurements to have criteria that could somehow be measured 
economically. In the judgment in Beentjes, the ECJ ruled that it was possible 
in a public procurement to require employment of long-term unemployed in 
the performance of a contract, provided that the requirement did not violate 
general principles of EU law, especially the principle of non-discrimination.
The evolution in approach that has been underway since January 1994 
has been slow, but Sweden was long on the way to making it easier to impose 
labor conditions and criteria in public procurements. The next step on that path 
was the Amsterdam Treaty that came into force in 1999 and brought about 
changes in the EU, which included the promotion of a high level of employment 
and gender equality in the European Union. The Treaty of Lisbon entered into 
force ten years later, in 2009, giving rise to the so-called “Lisbon Strategy.” It 
stated that the employment rate in the EU would be at least 70 percent by 2010.
Regarding procurement rules, the Commission published a number of guid-
ances on social procurement in the early 2000s. One of them was the Commis-
sion’s guide Buying Social: A Guide to Taking Account of Social Considerations in 
Public Procurement (2010), http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=6457&
langId=en. The guide states that the promotion of workers’ rights in accordance 
with International Labor Organisation (ILO) conventions can be considered as 
a means of bringing social considerations into public procurements. Id. at 8; see, 
e.g., Henrik Karl Nielsen, Labour Clauses in Public Contracts: ILO Convention 
No. 94 in the European Union after RegioPost, 2017 Pub. Proc. L. Rev 201. Several 
judgments from the ECJ, including Concordia (17 September 2002, C-513/99, 
EU:C:2002:495), have also paved the way for increased opportunities to have 
labor conditions in public procurements. In 2017, the Swedish Parliament even 
adopted a legal provision in the Swedish Procurement Act which required that 
specific labor conditions be considered in certain public procurements. 
B. The EU Procurement Rules 
1. New EU provisions on labor conditions
The European Procurement Directive 2014/24 was adopted in the Spring 
of 2014, and with it the EU Commission and the Member States took another 
step forward in terms of labor conditions in public procurements. See, e.g., 
Abby Semple, Socially Responsible Public Procurement (SRPP) Under EU Law 
and International Agreements the GPA, CETA and the EU-Ukraine Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area, 12 Eur. Proc. & Pub Priv. Part L. Rev. 293 
(2017). Article 18.2 of the Directive states:
Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that 
in the performance of public contracts economic operators comply 
with applicable obligations in the fields of environmental, social 
and labour law established by Union law, national law, collective 
agreements or by the international environmental, social and 
labour law provisions listed in Annex X.
In Sweden, some trade unions argued that this article should be 
interpreted as making it possible in public procurements to require that 
suppliers awarded public contracts have collective agreements. However, 
after two investigations, the Swedish Competition Authority announced that 
it was unlikely to be possible to impose collective agreements on suppliers 
in public procurements, as it would probably be contrary to the principles of 
equal treatment and proportionality (see, among other things, Commission 
Research Report 2015: 2). On the other hand, the investigations revealed that 
© 2018 Thomson Reuters
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it was probably possible to impose labor conditions in public procurements per 
se, provided that the conditions were compatible with Union law. 
2. The Posted Workers Directive 96/71/EC
One important aspect of the debate regarding labor conditions was 
the Posted Workers Directive 96/71/EC, which in most cases prevented 
contracting authorities from imposing requirements beyond the scope of 
the so-called hard core work conditions. See European Commission, “Posted 
Workers,” http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=471. 
The Posted Workers Directive 96/71/EC is an EU directive concerned 
with the free movement of workers within the European Union. The directive 
applies when a company agrees to provide a service to a client in another 
Member State and needs to send staff there in order to carry out this work, 
when a worker is posted in another country through arrangements within 
a group of companies, with the parent and subsidiaries based in different 
member states, and when a worker is posted through an agreement between 
an employer and an employment agency. See Directive 96/71/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the 
posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:31996L0071; Clemens Kaupa, 
Public Procurement, Social Policy and Minimum Wage Regulation for Posted 
Workers: Towards a More Balanced
Socio-Economic Integration Process?, European Papers, Vol. 1, 2016, 
No. 1, European Forum, Insight of 16 April 2016, pp. 127-138, http://www.
europeanpapers.eu/en/system/files/pdf_version/EP_eJ_2016_1_11_Insight_
Clemens_Kaupa.pdf. 
The hard core conditions -- which contracting agencies may address in their 
requirements -- include those relating to working hours, holidays, minimum 
wages, conditions for making workers available, safety, health and hygiene at 
the workplace, protection measures with regard to working and employment 
conditions for pregnant women and women who have recently given birth, as 
well as children and young people, and conditions regarding non-discriminatory 
treatment. Requirements covering other employment conditions, such as pensions 
and insurance, do not however fall within the “hard core” and so may not be 
conditions imposed by contracting public agencies. See generally Adrian Brown, 
The Lawfulness of a Regional Law Requiring Tenderers for a Public Contract to 
Undertake to Pay Workers Performing that Contract the Minimum Wage Laid 
Down in the Law: Case C-115/14 RegioPost, 2016 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. NA49.
The Posted Workers Directive 96/71/EC applies only if there is a so-called 
“definite cross-border interest.” In procurement situations, this occurs when 
tenderers from a Member State are interested in and/or participate in and 
submit tenders in a public procurement in another Member State. If it is a 
purely internal procurement in one Member State, such as in Sweden, then 
European Union law is not applicable, nor is the Posted Workers Directive 
96/71/EC. In such cases, a contracting authority could possibly include labor 
conditions in line with Swedish collective agreements that go beyond the 
“hard core,” which is generally not possible if European Union law applies.
C. The Two Bills from the Swedish Government 
Prior to the new Swedish Procurement Act, which entered into force on 
1 January 2017, the Swedish Government decided to set up a committee to 
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review the possibilities of imposing labor conditions in public procurement 
(SOU 2015: 78). The committee presented its partial report on September 
1, 2015, suggesting it would be mandatory for contracting authorities to 
impose labor conditions regarding pay, vacation and working hours in public 
procurements. The committee also suggested that contracting authorities 
themselves could decide on further labor conditions, such as conditions 
regarding other leave than vacation and conditions on insurances, pensions 
and on other terms of employment. 
The committee also wanted it to be possible for contracting authorities 
to impose more extensive labor conditions on Swedish suppliers than on 
suppliers from other Member States using foreign labor forces. The committee 
thought that the possibility of setting conditions for suppliers performing work 
in a procurement through posted work was limited by the Posted Workers 
Directive 96/71/EC (discussed above). Therefore, those foreign suppliers 
would be subject only to labor conditions covered by the “hard core” defined 
by the Directive, such as salary, working hours and holidays. The conclusions 
of the committee were fiercely criticized, as several experts said it was not 
possible to impose different terms on domestic and foreign suppliers in public 
procurements (this is an issue that is still unresolved today, but where the 
Swedish Supreme Administrative Court (HFD) has issued a permit to review, 
see case no 4092-17). 
The government ultimately chose to submit a bill in the Autumn of 
2016, actually Sweden’s most comprehensive legislative proposal ever, under 
which conditions for requirements other than those in the “hard core” were 
included (prop. 2015/16:195). The Swedish Parliament chose to reject that 
part of the bill, however. The Swedish Act on Public Procurement (LOU) 
entered into force on 1 January 2017 with the four proposed but rejected 
paragraphs, but they were empty of content. Instead, the Swedish government 
prepared a new bill (prop. 2016/17:163) with four new paragraphs on labor 
conditions, and these were finally accepted by the Swedish Parliament in 
the Spring of 2017. The four paragraphs came into force on 1 June 2017 and 
paragraphs 2-5 to of chapter 17 of the LOU are now filled with content. An 
English-language translation of the Swedish Act on Public Procurement, 
published by the Swedish Competition Authority, is available at http://
www.konkurrensverket.se/globalassets/english/publications-and-decisions/
swedish-public-procurement-act.pdf. 
 D. The New Swedish Labor Provisions
The new provisions on labor conditions are found, as noted, in chapter 
17 of the Swedish Act on Public Procurement. Initially, it is stated that labor 
conditions constitute so-called conditions of performance. These are conditions 
which a supplier must agree to and which are to be fulfilled during the 
performance of the contract, such a hiring long-term unemployed persons. 
These requirements are therefore not evaluated and scored. In summary, the 
new provisions imply that labor law conditions relating to pay, working hours 
and holiday are to be made in public procurement if an award is to be at or 
above a current EU monetary threshold, does not concern a procurement of 
social services or other special services, and if the procurement has commenced 
on or after June 1, 2017. However, the provisions are applicable only if they 
are “necessary” and if it is at all possible to determine the labor conditions. 
If we look at the different criteria individually, the first criterion is that the 
labor conditions in public procurement are mandatory only if the procurement 
© 2018 Thomson Reuters
NOTES
  Int'l-2-5
meets or exceeds the current EU monetary threshold. The EU thresholds 
mark the point at which the EU Procurement Directives are applicable, 
and thus, as a rule, so is European Union law. The EU thresholds are for 
government goods and services EUR 134,000, for other contracting authorities 
(for example, municipalities, county councils, public utilities, associations and 
foundations) EUR 207 000, and for all contracting authorities in procuring 
public works, EUR 5,186,000. All values  are exclusive of VAT. It is estimated 
that the national public procurement below the thresholds constitutes 75 
percent of all national public procurement in Sweden; this means, then, that 
the provisions do not apply in the majority of public procurements.
Public procurements relating to social services or other special services 
are exempted from the obligations for labor conditions. This means, among 
other things, that the provisions do not apply to certain healthcare, social 
services and hotel and restaurant services. The reason for these services 
being exempted is to simplify public procurements in these areas, especially 
for small businesses. 
A procurement is commenced once the contracting authority has chosen 
a procurement procedure. If that occurred in a procurement on or after June 
1, 2017, the procurement is covered by the new provisions.
Requirements regarding labor conditions should be made if necessary, 
but when is it necessary? According to the prepatory work (prop. 2016/17:163) 
for the labor conditions, the contracting authority shall make an overall 
assessment in the light of the risks of unfair working conditions and distortion 
of competition in connection with the public procurement. The contracting 
authority shall indicate that the assessment forms part of the determination 
of the subject of the contract. The Swedish National Procurement Authority 
indicates on its website that the term “necessary” does not contain any 
explanation for when something is necessary or not. There is also no 
established methodology or method today to make feasibility assessments. The 
Swedish National Procurement Authority has, however, developed proposed 
criteria to be used in certain industries where there is a risk of tax evasion 
or wage dumping. 
According to the Swedish legislation, a contracting authority shall use 
labor conditions only if it is possible to determine what these labor conditions 
are. If there is no available information for setting the level of a condition, 
e.g., regarding wages, the contracting authority does not need to use that 
condition. The preparatory work for the new provisions (prop. 2016/17:163) on 
labor conditions in public procurement stipulates that if the levels of salaries 
are not stated in the applicable collective agreements because they are 
agreements without fixed salary levels (so-called non-negotiable agreements), 
if the parties to a collective agreements keep the agreed salaries secret or if 
the parties’ interpretation of the terms is such that they cannot be used at 
all, the contracting authority will lack the basis for the terms. Under these 
circumstances, a contracting authority is not obliged to use the otherwise 
obligatory condition on salary. However, this does not mean that the other 
applicable conditions are not to be used, that is, those regarding working 
hours and holidays.
E. Summarizing Conclusions
The legal situation on provisions on labor conditions in public procurement 
in the EU is difficult and complicated. The reason is that it is not possible to 
NOTES
© 2018 Thomson Reuters   Int'l-2-6
take into consideration only national provisions and regulations. All European 
Union law -- including directives addressing procurement and workers 
posted across borders -- applies to public procurement above the applicable 
monetary thresholds. As a European Member State, Sweden must reconcile 
the sometimes conflicting demands of protecting workers, ensuring the free 
flow of labor across the European market, and maintaining fair and open 
competition for public procurement contracts.
The fact that the Swedish Government uses the procurement act to 
achieve policy goals regarding labor conditions does not make reconciling 
these demands easier. The Swedish Government claims that Sweden had to 
impose mandatory labor conditions to fulfill its obligations under Directive 
2014/24/EU, regarding procurement. However, if you will recall the provision 
in Article 18.2 of the Directive, it is not only labor conditions that are cited in 
the article. Article 18.2 also states that Member States shall take appropriate 
measures to ensure that economic operators comply with the applicable 
environmental and social obligations laid down by Union law, national law, 
collective agreements or international environmental, social and labor law 
provisions in the performance of public contracts. It is an open question as 
to what compelling requirements the Swedish Government will propose, and 
when, to protect those other interests as well.
III. UPDATE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM2
A detailed report was prepared for the Year in Review in February 2017, 
see Michael Bowsher, Brexit Mayhem: UK Procurement Regulation After Brexit, 
2017 Gov’t Contracts Year in Review Briefs 6, which attempted to project the 
consequences of the June 2016 Brexit referendum for public procurement in 
the UK. This year a great deal of effort has gone into political aspects and 
consequences of Brexit but little has changed that would provide any better fix 
as to where public procurement regulation is likely to end up in the long term.
A. A Few Headline Events in 2017 
Just as in any year there was a pipeline of challenges and case law (see 
the summaries in the Public Procurement case law digests for 2017 at https://
uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/2-532-4362?transitionType=Default&c
ontextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1). There was probably little 
in the new case law of any great interest beyond the UK procurement law 
community. There have however been some indications as to possible routes 
for development in the procurement challenge climate. A few headline cases 
illustrate important trends.
There have been relatively few challenges in the UK over the years 
concerning organizational conflict of interest (”OCIs” in the United States). 
A major challenge concerning management of the major new London-
Scotland rail project, HS2, was one of the first such challenges and is a 
good example of litigation bringing results in that it has heightened the 
sensitivity to these issues on HS2 and other important projects. Even so, the 
government continued to adopt its rather unattractive application of thinly 
veiled threats to stifle challenges3: for a summary of the story see http://
www.railtechnologymagazine.com/Rail-News/mace-decides-not-to-take-legal-
action-against-hs2-
In a bid protest concerning tender evaluation in the nuclear industry 
(noted in last year’s note), the government had to pay out over £100 million 
in damages to two bid protestors. The power of such a “terrifying” award of 
© 2018 Thomson Reuters
NOTES
  Int'l-2-7
damages can be seen in the increasing attention being given to improvements 
in bid evaluation procedures: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/03/27/
governments-bungled-handling-nuclear-decommissioning-deal-hits/
And a cavalier approach to procurement comes back to bite a Brexiteer: 
https://www.economist.com/news/britain/21726360-expensive-project-
becomes-expensive-mistake-how-london-threw-46m-thames. The proposed 
”Garden Bridge,” one of the Foreign Secretary’s vanity projects from his time 
as Mayor of London, has become the subject of significant investigation and 
comment. His, at best, casual approach to procurement issues has been the 
subject of substantial criticism in an independent report: https://www.london.
gov.uk/independent-review-garden-bridge-project. Unfortunately the legal 
remedies regime failed to achieve any concrete outcome. Perhaps the next 
steps will impose a political price: https://www.architectsjournal.co.uk/news/
boris-johnson-summoned-by-city-hall-over-garden-bridge-debacle/10026302.
article.
B. The Current Key Features of a Post-Brexit Landscape
There has been growing discussion as to the shape of procurement law 
in a post-Brexit environment. For a flavor of the issues being discussed see 
http://blogs.sussex.ac.uk/uktpo/files/2016/11/Briefing-Paper-8.pdf & http://
live.barcouncil.netxtra.net/media/574665/brexit_paper_19_-_public_procure-
ment.pdf, and Pedro Telles & Albert Sanchez-Graells, Examining Brexit 
Through the GPA’s Lens: What Next for UK Public Procurement Reform?, 47 
Pub. Cont. L.J. 1 (2017). 
It is rather difficult, though, to make any confident prediction as to final 
shape of UK procurement law. This note assumes that – as predicted in the 
note for Year in Review last year – the UK proceeds towards a Trainwreck 
Brexit in which the future UK-EU relationship is governed by a short agree-
ment. The current driverless approach would then lead the UK to one of the 
following outcomes.
“Norway”
This is short hand for membership of the European Economic Area (“EEA”) 
or for an arrangement akin to it. For a range of political reasons on both sides 
of the UK/EU27 relationship, this currently seems inconceivable. It would 
lead to the UK continuing to be a full participant in EU public procurement 
law while having a substantially reduced role in its direction.
“Canada”
This is short hand for an arrangement akin to the Comprehensive Eco-
nomic and Trade Agreement (CETA) trade agreement now in place between 
Canada and the EU (which is discussed in Paul Lalonde’s accompanying note 
in this volume). In the current political situation this is the most intense ar-
rangement that the UK can expect to get without bringing the whole Brexit 
process to a halt: http://jackofkent.com/2018/01/the-subtle-rhetoric-of-barni-
ers-now-famous-graph/. The agreement itself would provide for a very much 
reduced scope and intensity of public procurement law review than is provided 
under the EU regime. The procurement chapter of CETA is relatively limited 
by comparison with current EU arrangements so there must be a likelihood 
that the procurement component of the Canada model would be a rather more 
extensive than is provided for in the CETA arrangements. This will depend 
upon the balance of negotiating advantage in the next few months.
NOTES
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“GPA”
Perhaps the most likely outcome for a public procurement perspective is 
that the UK continues to behave as if it were subject to the rules of the WTO 
Government Procurement Agreement, either because it is agreed or estab-
lished that it is still a Member, or because it wishes to become a Member.
A Blank Slate
This is probably only a likely outcome in the event of a movement to a 
genuinely socialist government. This must be regarded as rather likely over 
the next 5 years. The Labour Party leadership is probably more genuinely 
socialist than at any time since the 1920s. There has never been a Labour 
government of this hue. A full-on rejection of much of the architecture of 
the international trade system must be a possibility in the event of such a 
government being elected. What did Marx have to say about public procure-
ment? Presumably like all law it just withers away (Collins, Marxism and 
Law (OUP)?
C. The Interim Situation 
It is now clear that at least until the end of a post-Brexit transition 
period, EU public procurement law will apply in the UK almost unaffected 
by Brexit. (A number of points of procurement mechanics will have to 
change to reflect the fact, for instance, that contract notices might no 
longer appear in the Official Journal of the EU.) That interim regime will 
presumably run on to late 2020, early 2021. Under the EU (Withdrawal) 
Bill the existing implementation of EU public procurement law would stay 
in place, and the existing decisions of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union would remain binding. Future decisions on the same legislation would 
be authoritative, at least for a time.
D. Procurement and Trade Agreements 
The government has currently placed great confidence in its notion that 
a new web of post-Brexit international trade agreements will bring wealth 
and happiness to all. See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/trade-
white-paper-preparing-for-our-future-uk-trade-policy-government-response/
trade-white-paper-preparing-for-our-future-uk-trade-policy-government-
response
The possibility of a future UK-US trade agreement is much discussed. 
It is hard to see much cause for optimism about this in the current climate, 
which has been complicated by personal politics. https://news.sky.com/story/
trump-royal-wedding-snub-could-hit-post-brexit-trade-deal-11199343. In 
procurement terms one might expect that, as now, the areas where the U.S. 
might hope to see opening up of trade would be in the health sector where the 
National Health Service (NHS) as a large influential purchaser remains an 
increasingly important purchaser of health goods and services (https://www.
theguardian.com/society/2017/dec/29/richard-branson-virgin-scoops-1bn-
pounds-of-nhs-contracts). This is controversial enough when the commercial 
beneficiaries of health service contracts are UK companies. Any further 
opening up of contracts to non-UK entities will be politically toxic for any UK 
government. So in the article above the government is reported as asserting:
“Decisions about public services, for example the National Health 
Service, will be made by UK governments, including devolved 
administrations, not our trade partners. The UK’s public health 
© 2018 Thomson Reuters
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sector is protected by specific exceptions and reservations in EU 
trade agreements which allow it to introduce or reintroduce more 
trade-restrictive policy measures in future if desirable. As we leave 
the EU, the UK will continue to ensure that rigorous protections 
for the NHS are included in all trade agreements to which it is 
party. The UK government ensures that decisions about how public 
services and outcomes are delivered for UK citizens are made by 
UK governments, not our trade partners.” 
This would appear to take at least one chip that the UK might offer off 
the table. 
Other significant difficulties are presented by the terms of the Guidelines 
agreed in December 2017 by the UK and the EU27. Specifically on the issue 
of the relationship between Ireland and Northern Ireland it asserts that the 
single market in the United Kingdom will be maintained while looking for 
specific solutions to address the unique circumstances of the island of Ireland. 
It is said that:
“In the absence of agreed solutions, the United Kingdom will 
maintain full alignment with those rules of the Internal Market 
(of the EU) and the Customs Union (of the EU) which, now or in the 
future, support North-South cooperation, the all-island economy 
and the protection of the 1998 Agreement.”
There seem to be no realistic “agreed solutions” on the table and in the 
absence of such solutions Northern Ireland must be aligned with the rules of 
the EU Internal Market. In order to maintain the UK Internal Market (and 
incidentally for the Conservative government to hold on to the Ulster votes 
it depends on to stay in power) it will have to apply the same rules in Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland. So no material departure from EU rules could 
be on offer – this raises broader questions about what the point of Brexit 
might then be. But in the context of the UK-U.S. relationship it raises real 
questions as to what the UK could possibly offer as a more generous offering 
than is currently available under current trading arrangements constrained 
by EU law. It also raises a paradox or contradiction in the whole situation as I 
have noted above that this ”Norway” type situation is probably inconceivable, 
yet it may be the only one that is consistent with the agreed constraints on 
the process.
Does anyone in the audience have any thoughts as to what else the UK 
might offer that might be of interest to the U.S. in negotiating the procurement 
chapter of a trade agreement? Correspondingly, it is not immediately apparent 
that there is any particularly significant and realistic opportunity for the 
further opening up of public sector business in the U.S. to UK interests. In 
the current transactional approach taken to such matters, it is hard to know 
what incentive there might be for any arrangements to be agreed that are 
any broader than those provided for under GPA.
E. Potential Substantive Changes to UK Procurement Law
Last year’s note for the Year in Review, supra, identified some changes 
that might be made to procurement law once the UK law was no longer bound 
by the letter of EU law. That list has been reflected in subsequent comments 
from various bodies, from arch-Brexiteering lobby groups to other more 
neutral bodies such as the Local Government Association. I focus here on a 
selection of these.
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•	 Procurement	Procedures:	there	is	a	pointless	profusion	of	procurement	
procedures, particularly for complex procurements, such as Public Private 
Partnerships. Each is unnecessarily detailed, particularly as the real difficul-
ties usually turn not on the precise terms of the procedure but on the true 
meaning of the general principles of equal treatment and transparency that 
govern all procedures. All the specified procedures could probably be abolished 
and replaced with a general obligation to conduct a fair and transparent pro-
cess. A more rigorous elaboration of the role of competition concerns in public 
procurement could also be introduced, particularly if procurement law were 
freed of the need to treat the EU internal market objective, see, e.g., Pedro 
Telles & Albert Sanchez-Graells, supra, at 4-5, as the primary goal.
•	 The	UK	has	increasingly	developed	procurement	policies	which	em-
phasize the need for enhanced local and social value in procurement. (This 
parallels developments in Sweden, discussed above.) These developments have 
often flirted with non-compliance with the EU’s still strict, internal market 
driven approach to these matters. Some movement to enhanced use of these 
measures may be expected. The government has made it clear that it expects to 
establish significant preferences for small business following on research into 
the equivalent U.S. programmes (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
leveraging-public-procurement-to-grow-the-innovation-economy-an-independent-
review-of-the-small-business-research-initiative-sbri)
•	 Housing:	one	of	the	most	pressing	policy	problems	is	to	deliver	hous-
ing (and related services) to a population which is still growing and expected 
to surpass that of France, and in due course Germany over the next 2 or 3 
decades. The current definition of works contract has brought within the 
scope of the procurement regime a number of development arrangements that 
might meet this challenge. Amendments to the way in which procurement 
law applies to public sector property developments might be expected. It can 
also be expected that the definition of public body covered by procurement 
legislation could be narrowed so that third sector social housing bodies are 
no longer covered.
•	 The	debarment	measures	are	weak,	unclear	and	impractical	without	
more working through of the detail of their operation. Given the increasing 
pressure to apply bribery legislation in a more coherent fashion this may 
become important.
•	 There	continue	to	be	tensions	around	the	use	of	framework	agree-
ments and dynamic purchasing agreements (analogous to indefinite-delivery, 
indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) contracts in the United States). The restrictions 
inherent in framework agreements seem likely at last to lead towards an 
increasing use of dynamic purchasing systems, electronically based systems 
which allow dynamic substitutions of offered goods and services. See UK 
Public Contracts Regulations 2015, reg. 34, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
uksi/2015/102/regulation/34/made.
F. Topics to Watch Going Forward: Performance of Public 
Sector Contracts Becomes a Political Nightmare
A number of new twists have been applied to the problems of performance 
in public sector contracts. Those interested in developing public private part-
nerships in developing transport service delivery may be interested in the 
ever growing challenge in holding the operators of train services to the terms 
of the arrangements that they put forward in their bids. The viability of the 
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market is even in question in some important areas of public service delivery. 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/nils-pratley-on-finance/2018/jan/02/
chris-grayling-east-coast-line-rotten-state-uk-rail-system
The most important and tragic public sector procurement saga arises out 
of the Grenfell Tower fire last summer. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-
london-40272168. A number of challenges for the process of specification, 
award and performance of these contracts will become an increasing focus of 
attention in the various ongoing inquiries being undertaken in 2018. In short, 
how could refurbishment of council owned housing to meet environmental 
standards have led to the tower being turned into a death trap? http://public-
sectorblog.practicallaw.com/are-procurement-and-construction-processes-fit-
for-purpose/. How is it that whatever is promised in the bid is not delivered 
in the contract as performed? https://www.architectsjournal.co.uk/news/
fire-safety-review-building-regulations-are-not-fit-for-purpose/10026395.
article. These basic, recurring questions will increasingly take centre stage 
in any review of public sector procurement.
IV. THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL PROCURE-
MENT4
While Sweden implemented its new procurement law in 2017, and the 
United Kingdom was largely distracted by Brexit, in the United States pro-
curement reform -- and international procurement relations -- were largely 
stalled in the first year of the Trump administration. As is discussed below, 
while the new administration cut back on labor protections (an ironic coun-
terpoint to the Swedish developments noted above), it failed to explain how it 
would implement the ”Buy American” initiative which was touted as a solution 
for U.S. industry and workers. At the same time, however, legislative reform 
continued forward in Congress, and while those legislative changes, discussed 
below, raise new issues for transnational procurement trade, they confirmed 
some of the more durable aspects of a mature legal regime. 
A. Socioeconomic Initiatives in U.S. Procurement
Unlike Sweden’s steady progress, socioeconomic measures were off to a 
rocky start in the Trump administration. President Trump and Congress 
summarily ended the Obama administration’s ”Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces” 
initiative, which would have barred vendors found guilty of labor violations. 
See 59 No. 23 GC ¶ 189 (June 21, 2017). Although the ”Fair Pay” initiative 
was hugely unpopular with many in industry, see, e.g., Cameron S. Hamrick & 
Robert V. Abbota, The ”Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces” Regulations and Guid-
ance Constitute an Unreasonable Use of Federal Authority, 46 Pub. Cont. L.J. 
217 (2017), the effort to tie contractor qualification to fair labor standards is 
a common trend in procurement abroad (see Part II, supra), and abandoning 
the initiative entirely left questions unanswered as to how, exactly, federal 
contracting officials should address performance and reputational risks raised 
by contractors that flout labor standards.
It should also be noted that abandoning the ”Fair Pay” initiative did not 
mean that all labor conditions were stripped from federal procurement. For 
example, statutory requirements under the Davis-Bacon Act, which dates 
back to the 1930s, impose ”prevailing wage” requirements, and so force con-
tractors to pay workers on federal construction projects wages commensurate 
with those paid across the relevant region. See, e.g., Paul Greenberg, Daniel 
Abrahams, Shlomo Katz, Complying with the Davis-Bacon Act, 03-11 Briefing 
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Papers 1 (2003). Like the European reforms outlined above, the Davis-Bacon 
Act’s protections were enacted, in important part, to keep low-price contrac-
tors from other regions from undercutting local contractors with ”imported” 
low-wage labor. Id. In many ways, the U.S. legal regime has developed in 
parallel with the expanding European labor protections outlined above -- the 
U.S. system has simply developed along a different timeline.
B. A Potentially Revamped ”Buy American” Initiative
Although the April 2017 announcement of the Trump administration’s 
much-heralded ”Buy American” initiative gave a political boost to European 
protectionism (see Roland Stein’s accompanying analysis), as Jean Heilman 
Grier noted in her blog the Trump administration did not provide further 
details on its ”Buy American” initiative in 2017, see Jean Heilman Grier, 2018 
Government Procurement: Preview of Issues, https://trade.djaghe.com/?cat=4; 
see also President Trump Signed Buy American Executive Order in April, 
But Administration Report Remains Incomplete, Targeted News Serv., Dec. 
12, 2017, and doubt remained as to whether any new protectionist measures 
would, in fact, be taken by the administration, see Sen. Baldwin Lambastes 
Trump on Unfinished, Tardy Buy American Report, Inside U.S. Trade Daily 
Rep., Dec. 13, 2017, 2017 WLNR 38599103 (”Other industry sources remain 
skeptical that the report will ever be made public, pointing to a crop of similar 
reports called for by Trump via executive orders in the spring. . . . ’At the end 
of the day, this [report] could just fall into the heaping pile of presidential 
promises that end up being incomplete,’ the source told Inside U.S. Trade.”).
In a news report published early in January 2018, Reuters suggested that 
the Trump administration’s ”Buy American” initiative might be turned to in-
crease arms exports by loosening export control requirements. See Mike Stone 
& Matt Spetalnick, Exclusive -- Trump to Call on Pentagon, Diplomates to Play 
Bigger Arms Sales Role -- Sources, Reuters News, Jan. 8, 2018. For the United 
States’ trading partners, this would convert Trump’s”Buy American” iniative 
into a sort of ”Buy American Weapons” initiative. but it would not at its heart be 
a procurement reform. Although the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program (a 
likely vehicle for such an initiative) leaves it to the U.S. Department of Defense 
to use traditional procurement processes to purchase weapons on behalf of for-
eign customers, see Allen B. Green, International Government Contract Law, ch. 
3 (available on Westlaw), published reports indicate that the core elements of 
the proposed ”Buy American” initiative in weapons -- loosened export controls, 
and more aggressive assistance in foreign military sales by U.S. military and 
diplomatic personnel abroad -- are only tangentially related to procurement.
Ironically, though, enhanced efforts by the U.S. government to ease export 
controls and otherwise facilitate U.S. weapons manufacturers’ foreign sales 
relate directly back to the arguments raised by European protectionists in 
favor of a ”European preference” in defense procurement (discussed in Roland 
Stein’s accompanying piece) -- that U.S. military sales are bureaucratic and 
slow, hampered by unworkable U.S. export controls. If the Trump administra-
tion does channel its ”Buy American” efforts into weapons sales in this way, it 
will be coming full circle, to confront the same European protectionists that 
have been incited by the Trump administration’s own protectionist rhetoric.
C. U.S. Legislative and Regulatory Reforms
As Steven Schooner and David Berteau note in their accompanying 
piece, U.S. regulatory reform essentially ground to a halt in the first year 
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of the Trump administration, stalled largely by agencies’ concerns over the 
President’s new ”two-for-one” regulatory bar in fiscal year 2017, which un-
der Executive Order 13771 (Jan. 2017) requires that the costs of every new 
regulation be offset by elimination of two older regulations. https://www.
whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-executive-order-reducing-
regulation-controlling-regulatory-costs/. As a result, only a small handful of 
new federal procurement regulations were issued in 2017. See, e.g., Defense 
Procurement & Acquisition Policy, U.S. Defense Department, FAR Cases 
Closed As of FY2017, https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/closedcases/far.pdf. 
That did not mean, however, that all procurement reform ceased, as the 
alternative channel for reform -- legislative action -- remained open. Title VIII 
of the National Defense Authorization Act, the perennial legislative vehicle for 
procurement reform, once again included scores of reform provisions, several 
of which are of special interest for the international procurement community. 
See National Defense Authorization Act for FY2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, title 
VIII (became law Dec. 12, 2017), available at www.congress.gov. 
Two of the NDAA provisions are notable because they show a mature 
system rocking to one side with stakeholder pressure, then righting itself 
and so seeming to confirm bedrock best practices:
•	Bid Challenges Reconfirmed: In Section 827 of the NDAA, in response 
to vigorous government stakeholders’ criticism of a perceived wave of disrup-
tive bid protests (bid challenges) -- some officials had even called privately 
for abolishing bid protests entirely -- Congress launched a pilot ”loser pays” 
program, to assess whether large defense contractors, if they lose a bid protest 
brought at the Government Accountability Office, should be forced to pay the 
Defense Department’s costs in defending the bid protest. This provision may 
have marked a high-water mark for those opposed to bid protests, however, 
for only a few days after the NDAA became law, the RAND Corporation 
delivered a congressionally mandated report (discussed in Steven Schooner 
and David Berteau’s accompanying piece) which concluded that bid protests 
of defense awards are a rare and healthy part of a procurement system. See 
Mark V. Arena et al., Assessing Bid Protests of U.S. Department of Defense 
Procurements: Identifying Issues, Trends, and Drivers (RAND, Dec. 21, 2017), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2356.html. Putting to one 
side the obvious problems of eliminating bid challenges (they are called for 
under most free trade agreements which address procurement, and are en-
shrined in Article 9 of the UN Convention Against Corruption, which has 
been signed by almost all nations of the world including the United States), 
the RAND Corporation report’s strong and supportive conclusions suggested 
that bid challenges will remain a stable part of the U.S. system -- and will 
continue to expand as a best practice in other jurisdictions. 
•	Best Value Validated: The RAND report on bid protests, supra, 
confirmed, at page 19, what many had long argued: that federal contracting 
officials often resort to price-based awards (typically using the lowest-price, 
technically acceptable (LPTA) approach) in order to avoid the risk of bid chal-
lenges. By basing awards on price alone (the thinking goes), and not balancing 
quality in a more subjective best-value trade-off, the risk of a bid protest is 
reduced -- but the user ultimately may not receive the best technical solution. 
Industry has long criticized LPTA procurement, and in Section 822 of the 
NDAA for FY2018, Congress reinforced the procedural obstacles to misuse of 
the LPTA procurement method. This counterpressure to low-priced procure-
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ment seems to confirm a trend worldwide (which has been recognized, for 
example, in the European Union’s and the World Bank’s embrace of best-value 
procurement, when quality matters): procurement systems consistently ap-
pear to be evolving away from low-priced procurement methods, and towards 
more nuanced methods (such as competitive negotiations, or ”competitive 
dialogue” in the European Union) which allow for better trade-offs between 
price and quality.
D. Key U.S. Legislative Initiative: Electronic Commerce Plat-
forms
The NDAA for FY2018 also included, in Section 846, a provision which 
could have serious consequences for international trade in procurement: a 
pilot program in electronic commerce, which could (in time) allow agencies 
to make certain purchases directly from commercial online portals.
While this reform seems simple, it could have revolutionary consequences. 
In a stroke, it could divorce public purchases from public contracts. Unlike 
current government electronic commerce platforms (such as www.gsaadvan-
tage.gov), which typically rest on standing IDIQ or “framework” agreements, 
goods and services offered under this pilot program could in principle be 
purchased directly from vendors, without going through a public contract. 
This would largely bypass normal contractor qualification and competition 
requirements, and would make prior notice of opportunities and post hoc 
publication of awards -- mainstays of transparency -- a thing of the past. As 
David Drabkin, a commissioner on the Section 809 panel (discussed in the 
accompanying piece by Steven Schooner and David Berteau), has noted in 
an informal initial review, this could raise issues under trade agreements 
such as the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). The GPA, for ex-
ample, assumes that covered procurement opportunities and awards will 
be published, that procurement awards will be competed in a transparent 
manner, and that contractor qualification will be done in accordance with 
ordered, established public norms. Thus, beyond being highly disruptive to 
traditional domestic procurement, this initiative -- informally dubbed by some 
the “Amazon.gov” initiative -- could radically revamp international procure-
ment obligations, as well.
V. CONCLUSION
As the discussion above reflects, progress over the past year in public pro-
curement in the three countries highlighted -- Sweden, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States -- is more notably similar than different. In both Sweden 
and the United States, for example, there has been extensive discussion of 
using public procurement to accomplish social and economic goals, whether 
to protect workers (Sweden) or to encourage domestic manufacturing (the 
United States). All three countries reflect parallel efforts to address com-
mon problems, such as competition, corruption and contract administration. 
Finally, in all three countries, international and regional trade agreements 
(such as the WTO Government Procurement Agreement) play important, but 
probably not dispositive, roles in framing legal reform. Taken together, these 
developments suggest that while convergence between national procurement 
regimes is accelerating, that convergence will occur not by force of agreement, 
but by consensus -- in other words, procurement systems will take common 
approaches not because they must, but because those common approaches 
reflect internationally recognized best practices. That, in turn, makes it even 
more important that transnational discussions of best practices in procure-
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ment grow more robust, and more readily accessible to policymakers and 
practitioners around the world.
1 As noted, this part of the paper was prepared by Professor Andrea Sundstrand.
2 As noted, this part was prepared by Michael Bowsher QC.
3 A free international forum on bid challenges will be held on the afternoon of March 
5, 2018, at King’s College, London (KCL). Building on a series of programs between 
KCL and the George Washington University (GWU) Law School, this conference 
at Somerset House, London will be the first true transatlantic meeting of judges, 
officials and senior members of the bar from both Europe and the United States, 
gathered to address common issues posed by challenges to public contract awards. 
Further information is available on the KCL and GWU Law School websites.
4 This part was, as noted, prepared by Professor Yukins.
